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Courts faced with questions about the law of democracy face a series of
choices that sometimes pull in opposite directions. First, courts can invoke
both anti-entrenchment and anti-discrimination rationales for judicial
intervention. Second, courts can articulate constitutional constraints in
terms of either individual rights or structural values. Third, courts can seek
to enhance electoral competition or ensure post-election representation.
This essay looks at three election law cases decided by the Roberts Court-
Randall v. Sorrell, a challenge to a Vermont campaign finance statute;
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, a challenge to Texas's
mid-decade congressional redistricting; and Purcell v. Gonzalez, a
challenge to Arizona's new voter-identification requirements-to see how
the Court negotiates these considerations. In both Sorrell and LULAC, the
Court seemed particularly concerned with competition and political
structure. Thus, for example, Sorrell focused on the critical role of parties
as intermediaries that enable individual voters not only to elect candidates
directly but to help shape the overall composition of the legislatures. In
LULAC, while the Court made no progress in resolving the question of how
to adjudicate political gerrymandering claims, it did set out a fuller notion
of representational rights in the course of deciding the plaintiffs' Voting
Rights Act claims that may prove fruitful. By contrast, in Purcell, the
Court-as it did in Bush v. Gore-wrapped what is best described as a
structural decision in the mantle of individual rights and the iconic
commitment to one-person, one-vote, and this choice left its decision
unmoored from any real consideration of appropriate remedies for flaws in
the law of democracy.
Asked about the significance of the French Revolution for western
civilization, Chou En-Lai is reported to have said that it was too soon to tell.
When it comes to the Roberts Court and the law of democracy, the early
returns are similarly provisional. Last Term, the Court decided two major
cases: Randall v. Sorrell,1 a challenge to a Vermont campaign finance
statute; and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,2 a challenge
to Texas's mid-decade congressional redistricting. The state of the doctrine is
reflected in the syllabi's recital of the lineups:
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BREYER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which ROBERTS, C.J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to all but
Parts II-B-I and II-B-2. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which SCALIA, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, and in which
STEVENS, J., joined as to Parts II and I11. 3
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I-A and III, in which STEVENS,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to
Parts I and IV, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and ALITO, J., joined, an opinion
with respect to Parts 1I-B and II-C, and an opinion with respect to Part II-
D, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, J.,
joined as to Parts I and II. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ROBERTS, C.J., filed an
opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part, in which ALITO, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS,
J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C.J., and ALrrO, J., joined as to Part III. 4
Nearly two hundred pages of United States Reports and twelve separate
opinions and all one can confidently say is that Vermont's law, described by
several Justices as the most restrictive campaign finance statute in the nation,
violates the First Amendment; that mid-decade redistricting is not inherently
suspect; and that at least one congressional district in Texas violates section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.
This level of disagreement is hardly new. In the Rehnquist Court's last
major campaign finance case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,5
seven Justices filed nearly 300 pages of separate writings, and the "opinion
of the Court" consisted of sections from three of those opinions. In its last
redistricting case, Vieth v. Jubelirer,6 there was no opinion for the Court at
all: four Justices would have held claims of unconstitutional political
gerrymandering nonjusticiable, four Justices would have entertained such
claims (although they split three ways on the applicable standard), and one
Justice declined to declare such claims off the table entirely while
3 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2484-85.
4 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2603-04.
5 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
6 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
[Vol. 68:743
NEW BEGINNINGS AND DEAD ENDS
simultaneously rejecting all the standards that had so far been proposed for
adjudicating them. 7 The Court is not just divided, it is splintered.
Even individual Justices sometimes seem divided. In the campaign
finance cases, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued for
judicial intervention precisely because incumbents can use campaign finance
laws to entrench themselves and undercut their challengers. 8 And yet, in the
political gerrymandering cases-where incumbents have the lines j iggered to
practically guarantee their reelection-Justices Scalia and Thomas have
taken the position that courts should stay out of the fray altogether. Justice
Kennedy, who has expressed his unwillingness to intervene in constitutional
redistricting disputes until a manageable judicial standard is devised,
recognized that the Court's experiences with the practicalities of campaign
finance similarly "give[] us little basis to makes these judgments, and
certainly no traditional or well-established body of law exists to offer
guidance."9 Nonetheless, in the meantime, he was prepared to strike down
Vermont's system.
But to paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, campaign finance and redistricting
doctrine are each unhappy in their own way. Over the past thirty years, the
Supreme Court has developed a complex First Amendment jurisprudence to
deal with campaign finance law while addressing redistricting claims through
a patchwork of doctrines that each deal with only a slice of the landscape.
After Sorrell and LULAC, the Court seems more interventionist in the realm
of campaign finance and less interventionist, at least as a constitutional
matter, in redistricting. But in neither campaign finance nor redistricting has
the Court's involvement achieved what John Hart Ely long ago recognized as
one of the central justifications for judicial intervention: "clearing the
channels of political change."' 10 To the contrary, our politics seems more
clogged than ever, at least in part because ofjudicial interventions that have
driven partisan impulses into new, and often more destructive channels-
7 For an extensive discussion of Vieth, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Where To Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymandering, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 541 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrel, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2503 (2006) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Vermont's failure to set separate limits
for primaries and general elections "will generally suppress more speech by challengers
than by incumbents"); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part) (stating that the federal
campaign finance statute "prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those
entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice," and that "any restriction upon
a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends
to favor incumbents"(emphasis in original)).
9 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
10 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74
(1980).
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what Sam Issacharoff and I once identified as the "hydraulic effect."' "I But
although the Court has failed to articulate clear rules for adjudicating
challenges to campaign finance laws or apportionment plans, the recent cases
at least hint at some doctrinal movement.
In what follows, I explore the Court's navigation of three key choices for
how to frame questions about the law of democracy. First, as Democracy and
Distrust itself reflects, there are both anti-entrenchment and
antidiscrimination rationales for judicial intervention, and these can
sometimes point in different directions. 12 Second, courts might articulate
constitutional constraints in terms of either structural values or individual
rights. 13 Finally, courts might be concerned with enhancing electoral
competition or ensuring post-election representation. While these pairings
address different aspects of the law of democracy, they also can all be related
to one another. At the end of the day, they are concerned not only with the
reality of electoral competition and representation, but with public perception
as well. And so I conclude with some brief remarks about the first election
law case of this Term: Purcell v. Gonzalez,14 in which the Court's per curiam
opinion articulated a striking account of the competing values at stake in
election disputes.
I. RANDALL V. SORRELL AND COMPETITION AS A
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE
The Vermont campaign-finance regime at issue in Sorrell (Act 64) had
two distinct features. First, it imposed stringent expenditure limits on the
amounts candidates for state office could spend in their campaigns.15 Second,
it imposed restrictive contribution limits on the amounts that individuals and
groups (including political parties) could give to candidates. 16
11 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999) [hereinafter Hydraulics].
12 See Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005); Kathleen Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 695 (2004).
13 This Essay is part of a larger project in which I discuss the structural-individual
problem in constitutional law; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of
Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1914 (2007).
14 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
15 These ranged from no more than $300,000 in the primary and general election
combined for gubernatorial candidates down to no more than $1800 for an incumbent
state representative. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2486 (2006) (opinion of
Breyer, J.) (summarizing the expenditure limits).
16 In a two-year election cycle, an individual or a political party could contribute no
more than $400 to any one candidate for statewide office and no more than $200 to any
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The combination of expenditure and contribution limits gave the
Vermont statute the same basic structure as the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1974 that had occasioned the Court's foundational decision in Buckley
v. Valeo.17 Like McConnell and Sorrell, the Buckley litigation produced an
intricate lineup and a lengthy set of opinions, but over the intervening thirty
years the case came to stand for a few basic propositions. First, both
campaign expenditures and campaign contributions involve political speech
entitled to First Amendment protection. Second, preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption constitutes the primary justification for limiting
these forms of political speech; by contrast, the desire to equalize citizens'
voices or influence in the political process is an impermissible goal. 18 Third,
with respect to this anti-corruption rationale, there is a constitutionally
significant distinction between expenditures on the one hand (by a candidate,
a politically active individual, or a group) and contributions on the other.
According to the Court, expenditure limits restrict the overall quantity of
someone's speech while doing little to combat corruption; as a result, they
have repeatedly been held invalid. By contrast, contribution limits impose
"only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication" 19 and serve to combat both corruption and the appearance
of corruption. Thus, "closely drawn" 20 contribution limit have survived First
Amendment scrutiny.
Save for the notorious crack/powder distinction, it's hard to think of a
line that has been subjected to more withering criticism over the years than
Buckley's expenditure/contribution distinction. As Sam Issacharoff and I
have explained elsewhere, because candidates can spend essentially
unlimited amounts of money, but must raise the money in relatively small
packages,
the result is an unceasing preoccupation with fundraising. The effect is
much like giving a starving man unlimited trips to the buffet table but only
a thimble-sized spoon with which to eat: chances are great that the
one candidate for state representative. See id.
17 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18 To be sure, in later cases such as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990), the Court adopted a definition of corruption that contained a strand of
equalization, at least with respect to corporate participation. And aspects of the finance
regime such as disclosure requirements may be important as much for their information-
forcing effects-knowing that a candidate has the financial support of wealthy
individuals or big labor or environmental groups may help voters to more accurately
assess his positions-as for their anti-corruption effects.
19 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
20 Id. at 25.
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constricted means to satisfy his appetite will create a singular obsession
with consumption. 21
And the pathological effects of the expenditure/contribution distinction
go beyond its effects on candidates: because politically interested individuals
remain free to engage in expenditures not consisting of contributions to
candidates (e.g., so-called "independent" expenditures), a number of
intermediary institutions have sprung up to receive and spend those funds;
for a variety of reasons, these groups are far less publicly transparent and
accountable than the candidates and formal political parties whose roles they
have supplanted.22 Money plays as large a role as it ever has, and perhaps a
more pernicious one.23
One thing that Sorrell showed is that the expenditure/contribution
distinction is now the sick man of constitutional doctrine. Only two
Justices-Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts-were prepared simply to
endorse it.24 Three Justices wanted to overrule it immediately. Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued once again that contribution limits
should be subjected to the same heightened standard of review applied to
expenditure limits.25 By contrast, Justice Stevens would have toppled the
Buckley framework in the opposite direction, applying the more deferential
review now accorded contribution limits to expenditure limits as well. 26
In their separate opinions, the other four Justices declined to reach the
issue whether Buckley should be overruled. But they each seemed open to the
prospect in a future case. Justice Alito, who otherwise signed on to Justice
Breyer's opinion, pointedly declined to join the parts discussing the
continued vitality of Buckley. 27 Justice Kennedy came quite close to the
2 1 Hydraulics, supra note 11, at 1711. Cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18
(characterizing the limitation on expenditures as "like being free to drive an automobile
as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline").
22 See Hydraulics, supra note 11, at 1713-17.
23 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("The universe of campaign finance regulation is one this
Court has in part created and in part permitted by its course of decisions. That new order
may cause more problems than it solves.... Entering to fill the void have been new
entities such as political action committees, which are as much the creatures of law as of
traditional forces of speech and association. Those entities can manipulate the system and
attract their own elite power brokers, who operate in ways obscure to the ordinary
citizen.").
24 See id. at 2489-91 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
25 See id at 2502 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (also
citing his previous concurrences and dissents taking this position).
26 See id at 2506-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
[Vol. 68:743
NEW BEGINNINGS AND DEAD ENDS
Thomas-Scalia position. After reiterating his view both that the First
Amendment "cannot tolerate" expenditure limitations and that the level of
scrutiny the Court has been applying to contribution limits is "unduly
lenient," he concluded his separate concurrence by expressing "skepticism"
toward the "legal universe we have ratified and helped create." 28 By contrast,
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, took an approach on the merits
that approached Justice Stevens' position. They (along with Justice Stevens,
who joined this part of Justice Souter's dissent) would have upheld
Vermont's contribution limits because those limits did not depress
contributors' speech "to the level of political inaudibility," 29 surely the
deferential approach of Buckley. At the same time, they would have
permitted Vermont to defend expenditure limits as an appropriate way of
"alleviat[ing] the drain on candidates' and officials' time caused by the
endless findraising necessary to aggregate many small contributions to meet
the opportunities for ever more expensive campaigning," 30 a more expansive
rationale than Buckley itself seemed to permit.
The (at least) three-way split on the Court creates an interesting tactical
dynamic. Seven Justices seem willing to reexamine Buckley. Six of them
have indicated, with varying degrees of clarity, that they think the doctrinal
frameworks for analyzing expenditure limits and contribution limits should
be harmonized. But that sextet is split three-to-three, with one trio that would
topple Buckley towards greater judicial scrutiny and one trio that would
topple it towards less. To make Buckley fall its way, each bloc must attract at
least one additional vote. While it seems quite plausible, based on the results
in Sorrell, to assume that, if forced to choose, the Chief Justice and Justice
Breyer might both choose to ratchet up the level of scrutiny for contribution
limits, rather than ratcheting down the level of scrutiny for expenditure
limits, it is not clear that they can be forced to make such a choice, especially
given Justice Breyer's penchant in election-related cases for fine-grained
analysis.31 Rather than further entrench the Buckley distinction, then, both
anti-Buckley camps may prefer to postpone the day of reckoning.
But while the Court may have made no progress on deciding whether or
not to scrap Buckley, there was some doctrinal movement on a different
28 Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2516 (Souter, J., dissenting). On this point his dissent was
also joined by Justice Stevens, thus indicating his understanding that the standard being
applied was the Buckley-derived framework for contribution limits.
30 Id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
31 Consider here his opinion for the Court in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234
(2001), where he analyzed the contours of individual congressional districts in North
Carolina to reach the conclusion that political considerations rather than racial ones
predominated in the plan.
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front-namely, the identification of the critical First Amendment value at
play in the campaign finance cases. The primary focus of both Justice
Breyer's and Justice Thomas's opinions was on how Act 64 dampened
political competition-an associational and structural value-rather than how
it dampened simple political speech, which might be thought of as more
individual rights-focused.
In reaching that conclusion, Justice Breyer proposed a two-step
framework that may itself be a doctrinal dead end. In step one, a court
determines the degree of deference to accord the legislature's judgment about
the level at which contribution limits should be pegged. Normally, Justice
Breyer wrote, courts should defer to legislative decision about the
appropriate level for contribution limits because "legislators have 'particular
expertise' in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office."32
(Of course, this very familiarity is one of the reasons Justices Scalia and
Thomas think courts should be especially skeptical of legislative judgments:
they see a substantial risk that legislators will calibrate campaign restrictions
to forestall effective competition.) 33 But when there are "danger signs" that a
particular restriction creates a risk of "preventing challengers from mounting
effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing
democratic accountability," courts must instead exercise independent
judgment and assess the "proportionality of the restrictions." 34 Put somewhat
more conventionally, "danger signs" trigger a kind of heightened scrutiny.
Justice Breyer's ensuing independent examination of the record focused
on five features of the Vermont regime that led him to conclude that it was
"not closely drawn to meet its objectives. '35 Notably, Justice Breyer never
actually specified those objectives. The most plausible account of Vermont's
actual objective in enacting Act 64 involves its desire to eliminate any
substantial role for money in the political life of the state. For reasons to
32 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2492 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at
137).
33 It raises the question whether finance restrictions enacted pursuant to initiatives
should be entitled to similar deference. On the one hand, the electorate lacks the expertise
enjoyed by experienced politicians. On the other hand, it also lacks the incentive to
entrench itself. Cf Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 503-04 (1997) (both discussing the general problem of
legislative entrenchment and noting that term limits, while popular with the electorate,
tend to get passed only through the initiative process).
34 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2492 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
35 Id. at 2495. The five features were the likelihood that the limits would restrict
challengers' funds; that they applied equally to political parties and to other contributors;
that they treated out-of-pocket expenditures by volunteers as contributions subject to the
prescribed limits; that there was no adjustment for inflation; and that there was nothing in
the record to suggest corruption or the appearance of corruption in Vermont was so
significant a problem as to warrant unusually low contribution caps. See id at 2495-99.
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which I have already alluded, that would require controlling the demand for,
as well as the supply of, money. But Buckley's foreclosure of expenditure
limits means that candidates' demand for money cannot constitutionally be
restricted. Under those circumstances, the rationale for contribution limits
must collapse back onto either anti-corruption or equalization. (Indeed,
absent an expenditure limit, contribution limits actually exacerbate the time-
preservation and campaign distortion problems to which Justices Stevens and
Souter pointed.) Since Buckley also forecloses a robust version of the
equalization argument, all that is left is the anti-corruption justification,
which will have little traction when the limits are set at an amount below the
cost of a fancy dinner for two.
Or at least it will if corruption is defined narrowly. Even the dissenters
largely ignored the question whether contributions actually skew the official
decisions made by elected representatives. Rather, they focused on the ways
in which unconstrained spending and unconstrained fundraising undermine a
particular vision of politics in which candidates spend their time interacting
with the electorate in a more substantive and engaged way.36 Thus, in a move
reminiscent of the refinement of concepts of sexual harassment in
discrimination cases, the corruption rationale has expanded beyond classic
notions of quidpro quo corruption towards a concept of a hostile, or toxic,
political environment.
Justice Breyer devoted only a cursory paragraph at the end of his
discussion to the question of corruption. The bulk of his analysis was devoted
not to figuring out whether Act 64 achieved its desired goal37 but rather to
articulating the costs it imposes on other constitutional interests. He shared
the dissenters' concern with the political environment, but saw precisely the
opposite danger. For him, the risk of Act 64 was that it would undermine,
rather than enhance, robust political competition.
This necessarily turned Justice Breyer away from an individual, speech-
based First Amendment analysis to an association-based one, treating the
issue as one of political competition, rather than one of political expression.
36 See id. at 2508-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2513-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Steve Teles has suggested to me that the time devoted to fundraising might
undermine the legislative process in a further way. Prior to the campaign finance reforms
of the 1970's, members of Congress spent more time interacting with one another face to
face outside the formal legislative process, and this informal interaction may have
contributed to goodwill across the political spectrum; today, however, these informal
contacts are less likely to occur and thus less likely to dampen partisan conflict. Email
from Steven Teles to the author (Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
37 Ironically, to the extent Vermont is trying to reduce the role money plays, the
failure to index contribution limits to inflation-a factor Justice Breyer identifies as
exacerbating Act 64's constitutional infirmity, see Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2499, actually
enhances its effectiveness, since over time the role of money would decrease.
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Individuals possess three related but distinct interests in the political process:
expression; vote aggregation; and governance. 38 Most political acts an
individual undertakes involve expression. Casting a vote, even for a hopeless
candidate, can be expressive in important ways, since at the very least, the
right to cast a ballot reaffirms an individual's full membership in the political
community. In the same way, even a political contribution of $1, while it
likely provides no tangible support to a candidate-indeed, the bookkeeping
it requires may mean that, like eating celery, it consumes more resources
than it produces-may be "meaningful because it represents a commitment
by the contributor that is likely to become a vote for the candidate. '39 But
voting itself is meant to serve a more focused function than simple
expression-namely, to allow a jurisdiction's constituents to elect a
representative. It is precisely this more narrow function that underlies a range
of Supreme Court decisions designed to channel voting into the actual
determination of electoral outcomes and away from pure expression.40
Finally, political participation extends far beyond voting: citizens care not
just about the elections in which they vote directly, but also about the overall
composition of the bodies on which their representatives serve, since that
composition will powerfully affect whether their policy preferences will be
enacted and whether their elected representative can bring home the bacon.
In partisan elections, this means voters may well be as, or even more,
interested in which party controls the legislature as they are in whether their
preferred candidate carries their own district.
In Justice Breyer's account, Vermont's contribution limits were
constitutionally defective because they interfered primarily with this final,
governance, interest, and not because they prevented individual contributors
from "speaking." 41 As Justice Breyer explained, not only did Act 64
38 1 develop this taxonomy more fully in Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote:
Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1705 (1993).
39 Sorell, 126 S. Ct. at 2513-14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing how this view
was held by a witness in the case).
40 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (stating, in the course of
rejecting the claim that individuals have a constitutional right to cast their ballot for a
write-in candidate, that "the function of the election process is to winnow out and finally
reject all but the chosen candidates, not to provide a means of giving vent to short-range
political goals, pique, or personal quarrel[s]," and that "[a]ttributing to elections a more
generalized expressive function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections
fairly and efficiently" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). See generally
Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330 (1993).
41 Justice Breyer did address their impact on volunteer services-which involve
expressive conduct by individuals. See Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2498-99. But he treated this
as "aggravat[ing] the problem" tl e Act posed for parties. Id. at 2498.
This focus was one source of Justice Thomas's disagreement with Justice Breyer,
since he emphasized that "contributors, too, have a right to free speech." Id. at 2505 n.3.
[Vol. 68:743
NEW BEGINNINGS AND DEAD ENDS
stringently limit the amounts individuals could contribute to candidates
directly, it also applied those same limitations to political parties. Thus, the
Vermont Democratic and Republican Parties, for example, could contribute
no more than $300 in any two-year electoral cycle to any candidate for state
senate and no more than $200 to any candidate for state representative.
It was because Act 64 threatened to "reduce the voice of political
parties," and not the voices of individual citizens, "to a whisper"42 that its
limits failed constitutional scrutiny. The Act's caps made it impossible for
the parties to serve their critical intermediary function in pursuing citizens'
governance interests. Justice Breyer hypothesized, quite reasonably, that
even in a small state like Vermont, many individuals will not know
legislative candidates in other districts personally, but will be interested in
the outcome of those out-district elections because control over the
legislature turns on them. The Vermont limits foreclosed individuals from
contributing effectively to the party, since the party could give only the same
amount as one individual. This result was particularly troubling because
parties are far more likely than individual voters to understand which
legislative races are in fact competitive and therefore likely to benefit from
additional investment.
In the end, while the Court's bottom line in Sorrell was clear, its
implications for future cases were a bit hazier. Particularly in its reliance on
interjurisdictional comparisons to justify more searching judicial scrutiny and
its several references to proportionality,43 Sorrell is reminiscent of the
Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence. 44 The problem with that
jurisprudence is that except to the extent the Court simply imposes a
mechanical standard-something well-nigh impossible to do with respect to
contribution limits-it provides little guidance in future cases. Saying that
the Missouri contribution limits at issue in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
42 Id. at 2498 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 See, e.g., id. at 2485 (stating that the contribution limits are unconstitutional
because "they impose burdens upon First Amendment interests that (when viewed in light
of the statute's legitimate objectives) are disproportionately severe"); id. at 2492 (stating
that once "danger signs" are observed, courts "must review the record independently and
carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute's 'tailoring,' that is, toward assessing
the proportionality of the restrictions").
44 For a discussion of those cases and the Court's somewhat ambivalent attitude
about various forms of proportionality review, see Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the
Lines ": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88
MINN. L. REV. 880, 903-14 (2004).
This Term, Justice Breyer wrote the Court's opinion in Phillip Morris USA v.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), holding that a punitive damages award of $79.5 million
violated the Due Process Clause. The Court's approach was somewhat reminiscent of
Justice Breyer's approach in Sorrell in its multi-tiered, context-specific way of assessing
when the risk of unconstitutional awards is present.
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Government PA0C5 pass constitutional muster while those in Vermont do not
requires a fair amount of artificially precise line-drawing and says little about
which other states' regimes may now be vulnerable. 46 Long ago, Justice
Cardozo wrote, with respect to due process, that:
[Courts] have said, we will not define due process of law. We will leave it
to be "pricked out" by a process of inclusion and exclusion in individual
cases. That was to play safely, and very likely at the beginning to play
wisely. The question is how long we are to be satisfied with a series of ad
hoc conclusions. It is all very well to go on pricking the lines, but the time
must come when we shall do prudently to look them over, and see whether
they make a pattern or a medley of scraps and patches. 47
Thirty years after Buckley, we're still at the medley stage.
The irony of the Sorrell majority Justices' concern with protecting
political competition, and particularly with safeguarding the ability of
challengers to mount effective campaigns, is that financial resources are
probably a minor factor when it comes to whether at least legislative races
are competitive or not. Parties and other politically sophisticated actors
"'target' their contributions to candidates in competitive races" '48 because
only a tiny handful of seats are really in play. The rest have been carefully
crafted to ensure a particular outcome. 49 And precisely because so few seats
are in play, those challengers with a realistic chance of winning may be
particularly well financed by party and out-of-district contributions. Until the
Court develops a jurisprudence to address the other competition-depressing
features of the election system, its campaign finance decisions may serve as
little more than symbolic judicial speech.
45 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
46 Justice Breyer provides a list of other state contribution limits, and many of them,
particularly given the size and populations of the states involved, seem rather similar to
Vermont's. See Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2493-94 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
47 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 96 (1928).
48 Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2495 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
49 For many years, the Center for Voting and Democracy predicted the outcome of
most U.S. House races long before the elections, without knowing the names of the
candidates, their campaign expenditures, or anything else except the share of the
presidential vote garnered in that district by each party's candidate. See, e.g., Center for
Voting and Democracy, Monopoly Politics 2004, Sept. 15, 2004,
http://www.fairvote.org/2004/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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II. LULAC v. PERRYAND THE ARTICULATION OF
REPRESENTATIONAL VALUES
In 1812, for purely partisan reasons, the Republican-dominated
Massachusetts legislature redrew the state's senate districts to ensure its
continued legislative control regardless of popular sentiment. The effort
succeeded: although the Federalists garnered slightly more votes statewide
than the Republicans, the Republicans captured 29 seats to the Federalists'
11. In honor of Governor Elbridge Gerry, who signed the bill authorizing the
redistricting, the practice came to be known as gerrymandering. Perhaps the
process of mid-decade partisan reworking of an otherwise entirely legitimate
map should be called "delayed redistricting" in honor of then-House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay, at whose prodding Texas's newly emergent
Republican state legislative majority redrew the state's congressional
districts in 2003 for the express purpose of "seizing between five and seven
seats from Democratic incumbents." 50
As many of the Justices remarked, the Texas plan at issue in LULAC v.
Perry51 could be understood only against a backdrop of several decades of
fierce political struggle as the Democratic Party lost its traditional dominance
over the state's politics to an emerging Republican majority. Following the
1990 census, Texas was required to redraw its congressional map, both to
account for population movement within the state and to accommodate the
three new seats it had been awarded. The Democrats still controlled the state
legislature and the governorship, and they did a masterful job: managing to
craft 17 Democratic seats and 13 Republican seats despite the fact that
Republican candidates were sweeping statewide elections. 52
By the time the 2000 census figures were released, the Democrats had
lost control of the governorship and the state senate. But because they still
controlled the state house of representatives, they were able to block any
Republican-drawn redistricting plan from going into effect. Faced with a
political deadlock, a federal court drew the new plan, which added two
additional seats. In the post-redistricting election of 2002, the plan produced
a delegation with seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans, despite the
fact that Republicans were now clearly the dominant party statewide. A
50 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 472 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (internal citations
omitted) (three-judge court), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. LULAC v. Perry, 126
S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
51 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
52 Texas Republicans unsuccessfully challenged the plan as an unconstitutional
political gerrymander under the notoriously stringent standard of Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986). See Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1172-75 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
(three-judge court).
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number of districts that voted Republican for other offices continued to elect
Democratic incumbents.
The 2002 election, however, resulted in Republicans taking over control
of the state house. With all the political branches now in their hands, and
after an unseemly wrangle in which Democratic legislators fled the state and
the Department of Homeland Security was asked to search for them,53 the
Republicans redrew the state's map in order to swing six seats in their
direction. Among the more notorious aspects of the plan was its partition into
five pieces of the district held by Martin Frost, a Democrat who had been one
of the architects of the post-1990 plan; its creation of a 300-mile-long district
connecting parts of Hidalgo County, on the Mexican border, with Austin in
the center of the state; and its reconfiguration of the southwest Texas district
held by Republican Representative Henry Bonilla, one of the few
Republicans otherwise at risk of losing his seat. The Texas map was both
procedurally and geographically an ugly piece of work.
If the question in Sorrell had been, with respect to campaign contribution
limits, "how little is too little?," the question in LULAC with respect to
political gerrymandering was "how much is too much?" That question had
deeply fractured the Rehnquist Court in Vieth. All nine of the Justices then
sitting acknowledged that excessive partisan gerrymanders raise serious
constitutional questions and all nine located the constitutional infirmity at
least in part in the Equal Protection Clause.54 And yet, a majority of the
Court had refused to adjudicate the plaintiffs' challenge to Pennsylvania's
congressional redistricting. Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion for himself,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, would have
held political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable altogether, because "no
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims have emerged."' 55 Justice Kennedy, concurring in the
judgment, was unwilling to foreclose the possibility that such standards
might emerge in the future, but he explained that "[t]he lack ... of any
agreed upon model of fair and effective representation" made it difficult for
courts to determine, "by the exercise of their own judgment," whether a
53 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., An Investigation of the
Department of Justice's Actions in Connection with the Search for Absent Texas
Legislators, Aug. 12, 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0308a/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2007).
54 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292-93 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(expressing an assumption that severe partisan gerrymandering is "incompatib[le] ...
with democratic principles" and "unlawful"); id. at 313-14, 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 347-52 (Souter, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
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particular plan unconstitutionally "burden[s] representational rights. '56 The
four dissenting Justices all thought that the Pennsylvania plan had crossed the
line, although they disagreed on how to analyze such claims.
Somewhat paradoxically, in light of its inability to adopt any governing
framework in Vieth, the Supreme Court directed the three-judge district court
in Texas, which had earlier rejected a series of constitutional and statutory
challenges to the plan, to reconsider its judgment "in light of Vieth."'57 Vieth
having cast so little light, perhaps it was not surprising that the three-judge
court reaffirmed its original conclusions. When the challengers once again
appealed to the Supreme Court, 58 the state actually waived its right to
respond to the jurisdictional statement and after considering the question at
six conferences, 59 the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
While the case did produce an opinion for the Court with respect to one
narrow question-whether the newly configured House District 23 violated
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it deprived Latino voters of the
ability to elect the representative of their choice-the Court made no
headway whatsoever on the question whether, and if so when, claims of
unconstitutional political gerrymandering are justiciable. Justices Scalia and
Thomas maintained their position that all such claims are nonjusticiable. 60
The two new Justices--Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito--refused to
take a position on the question, somewhat inexplicably writing that "the
question ... has not been argued in these cases," 61 despite the fact that
various appellants proposed a series of arguments as to why this particular
gerrymander failed constitutional scrutiny, all of which presupposed that
very point. In light of the continued stalemate, Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, saw "nothing to be gained by working through these
56 1d. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
57 Henderson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
58 As a challenge to a statewide legislative redistricting, the Texas case was
originally heard by a three-judge district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000) (requiring a
three-judge court when "the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts" is challenged). This meant that the case fell within the Supreme Court's narrow
appellate (as opposed to certiorari) jurisdiction. Michael E. Solimine, Institutional
Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68
OHIO ST. L.J 767 (2007).
59 See Supreme Court of the United States, Docket 05-204, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-204.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2006)
(detailing docket in LULAC case).
60 See LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
61 Id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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cases."62 Justice Kennedy rejected the various new standards that had been
offered-many of them centering on the mid-decade nature of the
redistricting63-but declined to "revisit the justiciability holding" of Vieth 64
that such claims are potentially justiciable, under some as-yet unarticulated
framework.
At the same time, in the part of his opinion for the Court that struck
down House District 23, Justice Kennedy performed, under the umbrella of
the Voting Rights Act, essentially the same inquiry that he had fretted could
not be done in political gerrymandering cases-namely, determining whether
a challenged plan impermissibly "burden[s] representational rights." 65
LULAC thus illustrates one of the hallmarks of judicial review of redistricting
over the past several decades: the repackaging of claims to fit the available
doctrinal pigeonholes. The Court has drawn a series of distinctions between
race and politics that have enabled it to strike down a number of overtly
partisan gerrymanders without developing a comprehensive theory of
impermissible line drawing.
At the start of the delayed redistricting, House District 23 was located
primarily in southwestern Texas and contained all of Webb County,
including the county seat of Laredo, a bustling border city that served as the
principal port of entry for U.S. trade with Mexico and that was 94% Latino.66
The district had been represented since the prior redistricting by a
Republican, Henry Bonilla, but given burgeoning Latino voting strength, his
days were numbered: even as the share of the district's electorate that was
Latino rose (reaching 55% of registered voters following the court-drawn
62 Id. at 2647 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
63 Id. at 2609-10 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Breyer
would have held the plan to be an unconstitutional gerrymander in part because the
decision to redraw the lines mid-decade was prompted entirely by partisan political
concerns. See id. at 2631-43 (Stevens, J., joined in part by Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2651-52 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
64 Id. at 2607.
65 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
66 The facts in this paragraph are taken from the brief of appellant GI Forum. Brief
for Appellants GI Forum, et al. at 6, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126
S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (No. 05-439), available at
http://www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/Brief forAppellants GI Forum.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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post-2000 redistricting), 67 his share of the Latino vote had plummeted
(dropping to only 8% in 2002).68
To shore up Bonilla's prospects, the map drawers split Webb County and
Laredo, which had previously been wholly contained within the district and
which had provided the largest share of the district's population, moving
nearly 100,000 people, the overwhelming majority of them Latino, out of the
district and replacing them (in order to comply with one person, one vote)
with portions of largely Anglo, Republican-leaning counties in central Texas.
The result was to reduce the Latino share of the voting age population to
46%.69
In Thornburg v. Gingles70 and Johnson v. De Grandy,71 the Supreme
Court had laid out a framework for assessing statutory racial vote dilution
claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Gingles had identified
"three threshold conditions for establishing a § 2 violation": 72 (1) the plaintiff
group must show that it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; 73 (2) it must show that it is
"politically cohesive"; 74 and (3) it must show that white bloc voting normally
results in the defeat of its preferred candidates. De Grandy had required that
once the preconditions were met, a reviewing court must consider the
"totality of circumstances," including both a series of factors identified in the
Senate Report that had accompanied the 1982 amendments to section 2 and
the extent to which the number of majority-minority districts was
proportional to the minority's share of the population.75 Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court in LULAC dutifully worked its way through these
various threshold conditions and factors, but the animating force behind his
conclusion was the way in which the redrawn lines undercut the
"representational rights" of Latino voters. He emphasized that in the
preceding few years, Latinos in the old District 23 "had found an efficacious
political identity, 76 and "were poised to elect their candidate of choice,"77
having mobilized themselves in opposition to Bonilla. The reason the state
removed Latinos from District 23 was precisely to undercut these voters'
6 7 Id. at 7.
6 8 Id. at8.
6 9 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613.
70 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
71 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994).
7 2 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614.
73 Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50).
74 Id.
75 See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1010-12.
7 6 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619.
7 7 Id. at 2621.
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representational interests, "protect[ing] Congressman Bonilla from a
constituency that was increasingly voting against him."78
If the justification for incumbency protection is to keep the constituency
intact so the officeholder is accountable for promises made or broken, then
the protection seems to accord with concern for the voters. If, on the other
hand, incumbency protection means excluding some voters from the district
simply because they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the change is
to benefit the officeholder, not the voters. 79
The same concern with the newfound concept of "representational
rights" may also have informed Justice Kennedy's explanation of why the
newly created District 25-a majority-Latino district that stretched from
McAllen and Hidalgo County on the Mexican border to Austin in the center
of the state, and which the district court and Chief Justice Roberts colorfully
called a "bacon-strip district"8 0 -could not compensate for the destruction of
District 23. According to Justice Kennedy, the yoking together of "distant,
disparate communities," even if they shared an ethnicity, would make it more
difficult for candidates "to provide adequate and responsive representation
once elected."'81
The interesting question regarding political gerrymandering is why
Justice Kennedy was unwilling to extend his analysis of representational
rights beyond Latinos in District 23 to encompass Democratic voters in other
parts of the state. To be sure, the Voting Rights Act reflects a congressional
judgment that the law should provide enhanced protection for the
representational rights82 of racial and language minorities. Particularly given
the courts' reluctance to develop a robust political theory of representation,
there may be especially good reasons for courts to implement congressional
judgments regarding minority political power.83 But the nature of the
representational injury suffered by residents of the former District 23 did not
depend entirely on their being a language minority.
LULAC marks the first time that Justice Kennedy, who had expressed
skepticism about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act,84 found a
violation of section 2. Perhaps he was influenced by the evidence that racial
78 Id. at 2622.
79 Id. at 2622-23.
80 Id. at 2655 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
8 1 Id. at 2619.
82 Or as section 2 phrases it, the "opportunity ... to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
83 See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
84 See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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polarization remains pervasive in Texas politics. That "the State took away
the Latinos' opportunity [to elect a candidate in District 23] because Latinos
were about to exercise it," he observed, "bears the mark of intentional
discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection violation." 85 But
precisely because politics will almost always be a better explanation of the
motivation behind district lines drawn by politicians,86 the Equal Protection
Clause alone cannot protect minority voters. 87 Thus, if Justice Kennedy
wants to protect voters like the Latinos of Laredo, and he does, section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act provides the best doctrinal handle.
The intersection of political and racial concerns in redistricting had
vexed the Court throughout the 1990's, producing the somewhat incoherent
Shaw doctrine: if plaintiffs could show that race was the predominant
motivation for a district's boundaries, the defendant jurisdiction was required
to show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest. 88 Throughout the Shaw cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas had
repeatedly suggested that there was no justification for taking race into
account.
But in LULAC, they seemed to switch gears. Justice Scalia's opinion on
this point, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, as well as Justice
Thomas, declined to trigger strict scrutiny with respect to District 23: the
desire to protect Bonilla showed that the primary purpose for that district's
configuration was political.89 That tack was unavailable with respect to the
configuration of the new "bacon strip" district, District 25. That district could
be explained only with reference to its racial composition: the state
purposefully created this new majority-Latino seat in order to obtain
preclearance of the redistricting plan. Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, District
25 could be upheld only if it survived strict scrutiny.90
85 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
86 See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 302 (1996).
87 This point ultimately doomed any robust version of the Court's Shaw
jurisprudence. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 253-54 (2001) (finding that even
the desire to protect a minority incumbent elected originally from a district held invalid
under Shaw was primarily political and thus did not trigger strict scrutiny of his new
district).
88 For an extensive discussion of the Shaw doctrine and a bibliography of the
voluminous literature it spawned, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 904-07 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
89 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
90 Id. at 2667.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas had never before found an interest that
satisfied strict scrutiny. 9 1 And they had expressed doubt about the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, at least insofar as it prohibited
state actions that were not themselves unconstitutional. 92 But in LULAC, they
would have upheld District 25 because it served the compelling state interest
in complying with section 5's nonretrogression requirement:
We have in the past left undecided whether compliance with federal
antidiscrimination laws can be a compelling state interest. I would hold that
compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be such an interest. We
long ago upheld the constitutionality of § 5 as a proper exercise of
Congress's authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enforce that
Amendment's prohibition on the denial or abridgment of the right to vote. If
compliance with § 5 were not a compelling state interest, then a State could
be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between
compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the compelling nature of the State's interest in § 5 compliance is
supported by our recognition in previous cases that race may be used where
necessary to remedy identified past discrimination. Congress enacted § 5 for
just that purpose, and that provision applies only to jurisdictions with a
history of official discrimination [such as Texas] .93
It remains to be seen whether, having treated section 5 as a justification
for the creation of District 23, these four Justices will uphold the renewed
and amended section 5 when its constitutionality comes before the Court
sometime in the next few years. 94 Cynics might observe that the first district
91 In Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005), a case involving temporary
racial segregation within California's state prisons, they would not have applied strict
scrutiny in the first place and, given a more deferential standard of review, they would
have upheld the department of corrections' policy. See id. at 538-42 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
92 See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
93 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
94 In 2006, Congress extended and amended the preclearance regime, keeping Texas
and other covered jurisdictions within its strictures for another twenty-five years. See
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 4, 120 Stat. 577
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b). The extension has been challenged by a Texas municipal
utility district. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, (pending before a
three-judge court in the D.D.C.) (on file with author). For discussions of the
constitutional issues involved, see for example, Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power
to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005); Karlan, supra note 83; Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing'
Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
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to survive strict scrutiny was one drawn as part of a Republican gerrymander;
the earlier districts that had been struck down as insufficiently compelling
were all contained within plans drawn by Democrats. But if the Voting
Rights Act provided a compelling basis for Texas to take race into account in
drawing congressional districts in 2003, it is hard to see how section 5 should
lose its raison d'etre immediately.
LULAC also marked Chief Justice Roberts' and Justice Alito's first
forays into the political thicket of redistricting. The most striking line of the
Chief Justice's separate opinion (joined by Justice Alito), which would have
upheld the Texas plan in all respects, came in his dissent from the Court's
decision to strike down District 23. He criticized the majority for finding vote
dilution at all, given the fact that the new plan contained as many majority-
Latino districts as the old one with the addition of the "bacon strip" District
25 and observed that "[i]t is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race." 95
Of course, the Chief Justice could have stopped the sentence after the word
"up," and it would have been just as true. Moreover, although his opinion at
least implies that the sordid divvying is somehow the product of the Voting
Rights Act, with which Texas attempted to comply by creating the "bacon
strip" District 25 to replace the prior majority-Latino District 23, the initial
use of race was entirely independent of Voting Rights Act imperatives: it
consisted of the state's partisan-motivated decision to remove Latinos from
Bonilla's district to shore up his prospects for reelection.
Ultimately, LULAC shows both how hard it is to disentangle the various
strands of the Court's redistricting jurisprudence, and how elastic that
jurisprudence has become both in providing Justices inclined to strike down a
plan with the means of doing so and Justices inclined to uphold a plan with
countervailing arguments. It also shows the continuing vitality of the porous
race/party line: the Court is willing to intervene to protect a group of voters
who are defined by their ethnic affiliation even as it remains unwilling or
unable to protect groups that it sees in political terms instead.
III. PURCELL V. GONZALEZ AND THE REVIVAL OF THE INDIVIDUALIST
ACCOUNT
Just to show how tentative any doctrinal advances from the Roberts
Court might be, consider the Court's one unanimous decision in the electoral
arena: its decision earlier this Term in Purcell v. Gonzales,96 to permit
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2341, 2361-74
(2003); Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination
to the Right to Vote 20 (2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-900161.
95 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
96 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
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Arizona's new voter identification requirements to go into effect for the 2006
election. In contrast to Sorrell, where Justice Breyer's opinion shifted away
from individual and toward structural accounts, Purcell took a concern that-
if it were valid at all-almost certainly sounds in structural terms and shifted
it toward an individual account.
In 2004, Arizona adopted new and draconian voter identification
requirements that required individuals both to present specified documentary
proof of citizenship in order to register and to present certain forms of
government-issued identification in order to cast a ballot on election day.97
Despite the likely disparate impact of the new identification provisions on
minority voters (not to mention on poor, elderly, and disabled citizens more
generally), the provisions were precleared by the Department of Justice in
2005.98 A number of individuals, organizations, and Indian tribes then
brought suit, challenging the requirements on constitutional and statutory
grounds.
Faced with an impending election, the district court denied the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction, issuing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law only a month later. In the interim, the plaintiffs appealed
and a two-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit issued a four-sentence
order enjoining enforcement of the identification requirements pending full
briefing and disposition of the appeal from the district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the court of appeals' order,
allowing the identification requirements to be used in the 2006 election. The
narrow basis for the Supreme Court's ruling was the court of appeals' failure
"to give deference to the discretion of the District Court." 99 Thus, the Court
emphasized that it "express[ed] no opinion here on the correct disposition,
after full briefing and argument, of the appeals from the District Court's
September 11 order or on the ultimate resolution of these cases." 100
97 See ARIz. REv. STAT ANN. § 16-166 (2006); id. § 16-579. Last year, in Maricopa
County (Arizona's most populous county), seventeen percent of registration applications
were rejected for failure to provide proper documentation, despite officials' confidence
that most of the applications were from eligible citizens. See Dennis Welch, ID Law
Blocking Legal Votes: County Officials Reject 1 of 6 Registration Requests Due to Prop.
200, E. VALLEY TRiB., Aug. 16, 2006.
98 See Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 6. The Department of Justice has declined to object to
several recent voter identification requirements, including one later enjoined as an
unconstitutional poll tax and an impermissible burden on the right to vote by both federal
and state courts in Georgia. See Common Cause v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D.
Ga. 2006).
99 Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
100 Id at 8.
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And yet, in its framing of the context, the Court offered a singular
account of the interests at play. On the one hand, the plaintiffs had a "strong
interest in exercising the 'fundamental political right' to vote."'101 The
"possibility" that qualified voters might be precluded from voting by a lack
of adequate identification should, the Court observed, "caution any... judge
to give careful consideration to the plaintiffs' challenges."'' 0 2
On the other side, the Court began by noting the state's "indisputably...
compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process."'103
That might have seemed like a structural concern, but the Court's opinion
almost immediately switched into the language of individual rights:
Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the
functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest
citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our
government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. "[T]he right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).104
The Court's rhetorical move is strongly reminiscent of its approach in
Bush v. Gore,10 5 where it also wrapped what was a structural decision in the
mantle of individual rights, and the iconic commitment to one-person, one-
vote. 10 6 The Court's equation of state denial of the right to vote with voters'
private decisions not to participate in a process in which they lack confidence
represents a breathtaking expansion of the concept of vote dilution. By
treating the case as involving a tradeoff between the rights of two classes of
individual voters, the Court has subtly shifted the terms of future analysis
from one that focuses on whether particular restrictive practices can be
justified to one that presupposes that some level of vote denial or dilution is
inherent in the system and the only question is which group of voters should
be excluded. The individualist turn in the Court's language stands in sharp
contrast to its far more structural and competition-oriented analyses in
Sorrell and LULAC. And it places a potential roadblock in the way of the
101 Id. at 7 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
102 Id.
103 Id. (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989)).
104 Id.
105 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
10 6 See PAMELA S. KARLAN, EQUAL PROTECTION: BUSH V. GORE AND THE MAKING
OF A PRECEDENT IN THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 159 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
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concerted political action that it celebrated and sought to protect in both
those cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court was onto something in both Sorrell and LULAC: the
political process, as it operates today, falls far short of the ideals of robust
debate of issues followed by elections that reflect the popular will and ensure
democratic accountability. But the Court remains deeply divided over what,
if anything, can be done to solve those problems, either by the political
branches or by the judiciary. Sixty years after Justice Frankfurter warned his
colleagues "not to enter this political thicket,"'10 7 the Court is embroiled in
the thicket more than ever. Part of the reasons for the current inconsistency in
the doctrine are the very real tensions that any jurisprudence of politics must
navigate: among stability, robust competition, and protection of minority
groups; between protecting individual rights and promoting institutional
arrangements that fairly reflect group interests; and between anti-
entrenchment and anti-discrimination models of judicial intervention. As
long as money and race remain salient in American politics-and it's hard to
imagine either fading away any time soon-judicial intervention will remain
both necessary, and necessarily dicey.
107 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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